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Abstract 
 
The young democratic experience of Mauritania is threatened to be undermined by two 
forces, one of internal and the other of external origin, that are continuously gaining strength: 
neo-tribalistic tendencies that turn the elected government into a 'sultanic power', and Islamic 
fundamentalism that is successfully attracting the interests of all social groups and layers that 
do not profit from the modest democratic achievements nor from the neo-tribal activities. To 
support not only the growth of democratic structures but also of national identity concepts are 
needed that combine Western-borne values with congenial Islamic values. 
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Democracy, Islamicity and Tribalism in Mauritania 
 
Mauritania had no chance to escape democracy. This sounds cynical, in particular after 
the palace revolution of August 3, - but it is meant to sound so. When Mauritania was 
dismissed into national sovereignty in November 1960 by the French an ever increasing 
confrontation set in: post-colonial, proto-state and state-like structures struggled with Western-
based principles of government. This confrontation, once triggered by ‘national independence’, 
then put in the straightjacket of democracy, and most recently embroidered with ‘good 
governance’ and the promises of ‘millennium goals’ - this confrontation can be regarded as the 
most reliable constant of the domestic and foreign Mauritanian policy during the last four and a 
half decades. The two confronting quantities - nation-state and democracy - are mere ideals, or 
rather concepts that have been subject to considerable theoretical dispute and strategic changes 
during the same period, both outside the country, and within. Looking back at this 
confrontation, one is stunned by the long and conspicuous neglect of a third constituent without 
which, nowadays, the magic triangle of ‘modern development in Mauritania’ could not be 
squared: Islam. 
     
The fathers of the first Mauritanian constitution of 20.5.1961 decreed in Article 1, 
paragraph 1 [figure 1] - with an unmistakable French accent - that "La République Islamique 
de Mauritanie est un Etat républicain, indivisible, démocratique et social" (Art. 1/1). They 
thereby created the first "Islamic" Republic in the Arabic Islamic world1. But by granting, in 
article 2, paragraph 2, the freedom of worship and conscience to the citizen immediately after 
having destined in paragraph 1 of the same article that "Islam is the religion of the Mauritanian 
people", they also created a semantic contradiction2. This contradiction must be taken as the 
symbolic expression of the irritation about the role Islam was conceived to play in this 
newborn state. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 H. Weide: Schariarechtliche Tendenzen in der Verfassungsgeschichte Mauretaniens. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut 
2000, p. 95. 
2 Both elements form already part of the first, pre-independence constitution of 13.5.1959, see S. Monteillet: L’islam, le droit 
et l’État dans la Constitution mauritanienne, in: L’Afrique politique 2002: Islams d’Afrique: entre le local et le global, Paris: 
Karthala 2002, pp. 69-100, p. 70. 
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 Figure 1:   Constitutional amendments (1961-1991) 
 
 
The political turbulences of the mid-eighties following the violent removal of the post-
colonial regime of President Mukhtār wuld Daddah in 1978 put an end to this irritation. In 
1985, Colonel Sīd Ahmad wuld Tāya, who was re-elected President for the third term of office 
on Nov. 7 2003, ordered an addition to the preamble of the constitutional chart. Two new 
elements were added that pointed the way ahead. The preamble now declared that "la seule et 
unique source de loi est la charia islamique" and article 5 confirmed that "l’islam est la religion 
de l’état et du peuple"3. Six years later, on July 12 1991, now under close control of the major 
international political and financial institutions, the Mauritanian government presented the 
current constitution to the voter - including the following significant modifications: The 
contradictory individual freedom of worship had simply been dropped or rather - if analysed 
meticulously - been replaced by the modern gender cliché, and the "seule et unique source de 
loi est la charia islamique" was toned down by "la loi est l’expression suprême de la volonté du 
peuple". In addition, the formulation from the old preamble where "l’attachement à la religion 
musulmane et aux principes de la démocratie" is flanked by the assurance that "les préceptes de 
l’Islam" are "seule source de droit et ouverte aux exigences du monde moderne"4. By omitting 
"unique" and at the same time respecting the "exigencies of modern world" the Islamic turn of 
the eighties was somehow tempered - only to be taken up again one year later with a 
                                                 
3 Monteillet: L’islam, p. 81. 
4 Monteillet: L’islam, p. 82; Weide: Schariarechtliche, p. 85f. 
 Constitution of 20.5.1961 Chart of 9.2.1985 Constitution of 20.7.1991 
Preamble … attachement à la religion 
musulmane et aux principes 
de la démocratie … 
 … attachement à l’Islam et 
aux principes de la 
démocratie … 
  
[-------] 
… la seule et unique source 
de loi est la charia islamique
… préceptes de l’Islam, 
seule source de droit … 
 [-------]  … ouverte aux exigences du 
monde moderne … 
Art. 1/1 La République Islamique de 
Mauritanie est un État 
républicain, indivisible, 
démocratique et social … 
 La Mauritanie est une 
République Islamique, 
indivisible, démocratique et 
sociale … 
Art. 1/2 … sans distinction de race, de 
religion ou de condition 
sociale… 
 … sans distinction de race, 
de sexe ou de condition 
sociale … 
Art. 2/1 
 
La religion du peuple 
mauritanien est la religion 
musulmane … 
  
Art. 2/2 … guarantit à chacun la liberté 
de conscience et le droit de 
partiquer sa religion … 
  
[------] 
Art. 5  L’Islam est la religion de 
l’État et du peule 
L’Islam est la religion du 
peuple et de l’État 
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significantly different undertone. In February 1992, a constitutional decree (no. 07-92, Febr. 16) 
precised the general wording of the just newly introduced article 94. It stipulated that the five 
members of the "High Islamic Council" be chosen from among the ‘ulamā’ of the Republic 
(article 3) and act "according to the principle of šūrā (consultation)" (article 7), with the 
specific order in article 5 that the "general politics of the Nation obey Islamic orientation" and 
that "Islam play the first role in Mauritanian society"5. 
     
With respect to the democratic elements in the constitutions, the modifications 
remained of secondary importance. Both constitutions (Art. 9 of the old one of ’61 just like Art. 
11 of the new one of ’91) significantly curb the liberty political parties enjoy: No party was to 
question territorial integrity - a realistic problem after the bloody border-conflict with Senegal 
in 1989. And while prohibited to harm national sovereignty and unity, the parties were only 
requested to respect the democratic principles6. Therefore, parties that pursue religious - that is 
to say: Islamic - or ethnic ends, are banned. So, curiously enough, the only and undisputedly 
national bonds that concern every single citizen are made unavailable for the organized 
expression of democratic will. Further on, article 2 of the ’91 constitution was given a new 
heading: "La peuple est la source de tout pouvoir". In comparison with earlier Mauritanien 
(1960: article 7) and other Islamic constitutions7, this reference to the democratic and eo ipso 
secular character of the source of sovereignty must be understood as an explicit restriction on 
Islamic aspirations to theocratic claims of power. 
     
One can conclude from this short overview of the constitutions’ introductory ‘general 
elements and principles’ (titre I) that the concept of Islamicity has undergone some significant 
modifications during the constitutional process in Mauritania since independence. If extended 
to other sections of the constitution, this comparative analysis yields similar results. Islamic 
constitutional elements not only strongly proliferated, but at the same time tended to get 
entangled in Western-borne secular concepts of liberty of religion and opinion, of trade and 
contract, and - in particular - in the concept of an independent judicial power. Just like 
constitutions, but more immediately, systems of laws also reflect the development of the 
societies that bring them forth. With respect to the observation made above, the citation of a 
Mauritanian scholar of law, Mohamed Yahya Abdelwedoud, who recently investigated the 
impact of Islamic traditions on the organisation of jurisprudence in his country8, may serve us 
as a general guide-line: "A côté de l’organisation judicaire, la codification du droit des 
obligations et contrats (1989) et du droit commercial (2000) tient compte de l’habitude des 
Mauritaniens d’être régis par des règles inspirées du droit français, mais aussi de leur désir de 
garder un pied ferme dans les traditions musulmanes"9 . 
     
"The strong foothold in Muslim traditions", as Mohamed Yahya put it, is too mild and 
static a metaphor for what has happened in this country during the last 25 years. The increasing 
constitutional and legal consideration of Islamic values and institutions reflect a continuous 
and heterogeneous process of reorientation to religious concepts. 
                                                 
5 Monteillet: L’islam, p. 77. 
6 Weide: Schariarechtliche, p. 109. 
7 Weide: Schariarechtliche, pp. 97-99. 
8 Abdelwedoud, Mohamed Yahya: Le système judicaire mauritanien après l’indépendence, in: Revue Juridique et Politique, 
Mai-Août 2001, 55/2, pp. 141-154. 
9 Ibid.: p. 153. 
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     On the political level, the process started when Mu’āwiya wuld Muhammad Sālik who 
had just overthrown the post-colonial, autocratic regime of Wuld Dāddah, introduced on Dec. 
12th 1980 a constitutional amendment that ended the coexistence of Muslim and modern law 
to the advantage of "the general application of the šarī’a". When four years later, in Dec. 1984, 
the Colonel Ould Taya gained power by a successful coup - and lost it two months ago, after 
21 years, in just the same way -, this amended law was reinforced, as we have already heard, 
and the šarī’a - for a brief period - strictly applied, to the painful disadvantage of some poor 
creatures. Mauritania now acceded to the ‘Organization of the Islamic Conference’ (OIC), the 
hitherto largest organization of Islamic states, and in 1989 became a founding member of the 
‘Islam in Africa Organization’. This IAO is essentially an African-wide da’wa (missionary) 
organization that desires – quoting its Preamble - "to forge a common front to unite the umma 
with a view to facing the common enemies - the imperialist and Zionist forces of domination 
and secularisation". 10  This process, once opened and directed by the governmental head, 
inexorably affected the Mauritanian toes too. Bureaus of pan-Islamic, or Islamistic 
organizations opened in Nouackchott. By the end of the nineties, Mauritania had become an 
integral part of the world-wide net-work of Islamic missionary and propaganda movement. 
Notwithstanding the wide popularity of the Saudi-controlled Wahhābī movement, splinter 
groups of many a different origin, the Palestinian Hamas, the Libyan ad-Da’wa al-Islāmīya, 
the Pakistani at-Tablīgh mission, to mention just some of them, found supporters from among 
all layers of the society. Already in 1999, those suspected of having joined Usāma b. Lādin’s 
and his brother Tāriq’s organization were arrested in Nouakchott11. In the same year, on the 
other hand, the government, in amazing disharmony with the just quoted Preamble of the IAO, 
established diplomatic relations with Israel. 
     
Let us now turn from the political to the cultural level, where this reorientation took on 
different faces. To illustrate this, I will limit myself to two fields: to the public Islamic 
appearance and to education. In the beginning of the eighties, two enormous central mosques 
were constructed simultaneously in the capital Nouakchott [figure 2]: one financed by Saudi-
Arabia, one by King Hassan V of Morocco. Both remained poorly attended during the ensuing 
years as did the few dozen local mosques in the poor districts, and the growing suburbs of 
Nouakchott. Nowadays, however, both these central mosques, as well as a recently estimated 
670 local mosques of the capital12 regularly fill at prayer times with queues of blue or white 
clothed believers. Moreover, the endless squatter camps [figure 3] shooting up along the few 
tarred roads of the country and the outskirts of Nouackchott where about 80% of the 
Mauritanian people have fled to from the drought, display a similar feature: they visibly grow 
around crude mosques, the new symbols of communal identity. 
     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Hunwick, John: Sub-Saharan Africa and the wider world of Islam. Historical and contemporary perspectives, in: Rosander, 
Eva Evers & Westerlund, David [Eds.]: African Islam and Islam in Africa. Encounters between Sufis and Islamists., pp. 28-54, 
p. 41f. 
11 Marty, Marianne: Les multiples usages de l’islam dans le champ politique mauritanien, in: L’Afrique politique 2002: Islams 
d’Afrique: entre le local et le global, Paris: Karthala 2002, pp. 51-68, p. 62f. 
12 Personal communication 2004 of Dr. Yahyā wuld al-Barrā’, based on his investigation of 2002. 
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Figure 2: Saudimoschee 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Badiamoschee 
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Less impressionistic, but more indicative are the features of the Mauritanian school 
system. Since independence and under increasing pressure from international institutions and 
donors, the Mauritanian government has felt compelled to build up a secular school system, 
alongside and in strategic competition with the traditional Islamic system of learning, the 
Koranic schools and the mahādir or - as they have been correctly rendered - the Islamic ‘tent-
universities’ [figure 4.]  
 
Figure 4: Mahadir 
 
Mahādir development in Mauritania 
 
 Population mahādir students 
1905 0.4 Mio  [est.] 800 [----] 
1960 1.0 Mio  [est.] 691 5 765 [!] 
1977  657 54 128 
1979  430 32 547 
1986 1,8 Mio  [est.] 257 20 641 
1986: Establishment of Secrétariat d’Etat à l’alphabétisation et à l’enseignement 
originel 
2003 2,7 Mio  [est.] 1 524 72 799 
 
Attendance at Arabic course of study 
 
 1980-1981 1985-1986 1990-1991 1996-1996 1998-1999 
Primary  81% 97,4% 93,4% 96% 
Secondary 35,1% 72,4% 78% 87% 87,5% 
Higher 28,2% 63,8% 77% 81,9% 86% 
 
 
The earliest available numbers go back to 1905, when - statistically - 500 inhabitants 
shared one mahadra. Until independence, a slight fall in number can be seen. The evacuation 
of the desert owing to the continuous drought periods of the seventies, and the subsequent 
endeavours of the government to get along with the new school system, caused a significant 
drop until 1986. By then, as we have seen, the over-all conditions had changed. Education had 
become a major issue in the argument about the new orientation of the nation. In particular, a 
quarrel was fought concerning the rival concepts of an ‘Islamic curriculum in Arabic’ and a 
‘modern Western curriculum in French’. The almost simultaneous foundation of two opposite 
institutes marks this period best. In 1979 the ‘Institut Supérieur des Etudes et Recherches 
Islamiques’ (ISERI) was established to produce from then on the necessary number of teachers, 
Imams and qādīs. One year later, the non-arabophone minorities were granted their ‘Institut 
des Langues nationales’ where curricula and teachers of the African languages, Fulani, Wolof, 
Soninké and Bambara, were to be produced. But not for long; the course of the trend became 
clear in 1986 when the ‘State Secretary of alphabetisation and original learning’ was 
established. From that point on, the concept of Arab Islamic identity governed the educational 
policy. In the constitution of 1991 (article 6), not only French did lose its status as ‘official 
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language’, but also the African languages were refused acceptance as such13. The extent to 
which the traditional mahadra system profited from this trend, is clearly visible14. On the other 
hand, the long-established bilingual course of study which combined a basic religious 
education in Arabic with a secondary scientific education in French, suffered a lasting 
setback15. Secondary and higher education, solely in Arabic, steadily increased and took over. 
     
It was during this period of reorientation that the ‘democratic wave’ hit the country. The 
impatience of the international community with underdevelopment and backwardness 
manifested itself first in the field of human rights. On November 11, 1980, for the third time - 
though not the last time -, Mauritania had to officially declare the abolishment of slavery. In 
1986, under increasing pressure, the ruling Military government had to allow the establishment 
of the ‘Mauritanian League of Human Rights’16. Economic sanctions by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund emphasized this pressure. In the same year, 1986 [figure 5], 
the first local elections since independence, were carried out17. Simultaneously - to keep track 
of what was happening on the other side of the coin - Saudi capital had given birth to the 
‘Islamic Bank of Mauritania’, import and consumption of alcohol been strictly forbidden, but 
also a document under the title Oppressed Black African Manifesto was distributed among the 
the large minority of non-Arabic Mauritanian population18. Politics followed. In 1990, during 
the 16th French-African summit at La Baule in France, then and today the most important 
international partner, the French prime minister, François Mitterrand, declared that from then 
on the allowance of economic and development aid would be closely attached to the pursuit of 
democratic reforms and obedience to human rights19. Thus, the combined forces of advocates 
of human rights, free trade and voter’s democracy had rallied in shape of a virtual global 
‘liberty-trust’ and proclaimed their strategy: blackmail into freedom. And Mauritania, one of 
the 20 poorest and most indebted countries of the world, according to the UNDP-Index, indeed, 
had no alternative. Democracy was now installed from above, the spirit of La Baule was 
converted into democratic legitimation. Between July 1991 and April 1992, within 9 1/2 
months, the period of a political pregnancy, the country metamorphosed from a military regime 
into a parliamentary democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Clausen, Ursel: Demokratisierung in Mauretanien. Einführung und Dokumente. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut 1993, 
p. 31. 
14 Bonte, Pierre: Evaluation du systeme culturel Mauritanien sous l’angle des problemes de developpement. Rapport final. 
Nouakchott: 2003 [unpublished], pp. 110-111. 
15 Ibid., p. 116. 
16 Clausen: Demokratisierung, p. 46. 
17 Ould Cheikh, Abdelwedoud: Des voix dans les déserts. Sur les elections de "l’ère pluraliste", in: Politique Africaine 55, Oct. 
1994, pp. 31-39, p. 32. 
18 Hilling, David: MAURITANIA. Physical and Social Geography, in: Africa South of the Sahara 2004. London: Europa 
Publications 2003, pp. 699-720, p. 700a. 
19 Clausen, Demokratisierung, p. 29. 
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Figure 5: ‘Democratic’ elections in Mauritania 
 
19.02.1986:  Municipales régionales (only capitals)    
01.1989:       Conseils municipaux, maires, chefs-lieu de département (32) 
07.12.1990:  Municipales (208 communes) 
12.07.1991:  Constitution (97,9%) 
24.01.1992:  1. Présidentielles (62,7%) 
03.1992:       Législatives (PRDS 67 of 79 seats) 
04.1992:       Sénat (PRDS 35 of 56 seats) 
28.01.1994:  Municipales 
10.1996:       Législatives (PRDS 71 of 79 seats) Sénat (PRDS 17 of 18 seats) 
12.12.1997:  2. Présidentielles (90,9%) 
04.2000:       Sénat (PRDS 13 of 18 seats) 
10.2001:       Législatives (PRDS 64 of 81 seats) et Municipales (PRDS 184 of 216) 
07.11.2003:  3. Présidentielles (66,9%) 
04.2004:       Sénat (PRDS 17 of 18 seats) 
 
 
 
Yet, shortly before 1989, Col. Ould Tāya, then still head of the Military Council, had 
declared:  
 
"One cannot put the cart before the horse. The Mauritanians must first be educated before being 
politically active. [...] Hardly 32% attend public schools. We must first dispose of analphabetism, and 
teach as much Mauritanians as possible to read and write and to understand their civil rights before 
heading - as quickly as possible - for democracy."20  
 
Three years [figure 6] later, though, and with the catalytic help of ballot-boxes, the head 
of a military dictatorship had been transformed into a democratically elected prime minister. 
The back-bone of this transformation was the newly formed Democratic and Social 
Republican Party (Parti Républicain, Démocratique et Social = PRDS), one of 16 parties the 
majority of which had been founded out of nothing (and had been admitted to the elections by 
the old minister of the interior). Closely scrutinized, the results of the elections between 1992 
and 2004 purport a message that turns the expectation pinned on elections, the very nerve of 
democracy, on its head: The predominance of the pro-governmental PRDS is being regularly 
confirmed by election results that legitimize the exclusive control of the entire state machinery. 
As for the elections of 2001, subtract the six ‘cooperative’, in fact pro-governmental mandates 
of the RFD and UFP, and the ‘old’ relation is restored. The blunt thrust of this message, 
however, reveals more: The de facto one-party rule of the PRDS seems simply to be a 
democratic version of the Parti du Peuple Mauritanien (PPM) to which the constitution of 
1961 (article 9) had entrusted a one-party rule until 1978, and - in due course - of the Military 
Committee which took over the monopoly of power from the PPM and ruled until 1991. If 
democratic reforms had no significant effect on the monolithic organization of power and the 
social participation in political authority, then either the reforms had not worked or the 
Mauritanians are persistently and democratically expressing their will to monocratic rule. 
                                                 
20 Interview in Arabies, no. 26, Paris February 1989, pp. 28ff.; see Clausen, ibid. 
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Figure 6: Table of political parties (1991-2004) and seats won 
 
                                       Party 1992 1996 2001 
PRDS 
[---] 
Parti Républicain, Démocratique et Social 
‘Independent’ [=PRDS] candidates 
67 
10 
71 
6 
64 
- 
RDU Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et l’Unité 1 1 3 
PMR Parti Mauritanien du Renouveau 1 - - 
UFD [/EN] 
=> UFP 
Union des Forces Démocratiques [/Ère nouvelle] 
Union des Forces du Progrès  [2000] 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
AC [CC] Action [Comité] pour le Changement [2003] - 1 4 
RFD Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques [2001] - - 3 
UDP Union pour la Démocratie et l’Unité [1993] - - 3 
FP Front Populaire [1998]   1 
PJD Parti pour la Justice et la Démocratie    
APP Alliance Populaire pour le Progrès    
PCDM Parti du Centre Démocratique Mauritanien    
UPC Union de la Planification pour la Construction    
PAN Parti de l’Avant-Garde Nationale    
PLEJ Parti pour la Liberté, l’Égalité et la Justice    
PTUN Parti du Travail et de l’Unité Nationale    
PNUD Parti National pour l’Unité et la Démocratie    
USD Union Sociale Démocratique    
RNUJ Rassemblement National pour l’Unité et la Justice    
MW El Mithagh El Watani    
PSD Union Populaire Sociale et Démocratique    
Umma Islamic community, no party status    
Total  79 79 81 
 
   
The first option, of course, seems more plausible: all elections were attested by 
international observers to have been carried out under more or less constantly defective 
conditions. The local hand-written birth registers, for example, from which voters had to prove 
their right to vote, are - if existing at all - not only too remote and inaccessible for most of the 
poor urban population, they are also incomplete, often lacking the exact date and place of birth, 
and - if not lacking - yet - at best - ambiguous: around "wuld" or "mint" (son, daughter of) 
about 30% of the Mauritanian high-school students have a variant of "Muhammad" in their 
name: Nothing easier than to reject a voters’ claim to be the very Muhammad wuld 
Muhammad of the polling-list 21 . But even admitted, that the elections were bluntly 
manipulated, some democratic legitimacy remains: external estimations assess the real turnout 
at about 30% - that of the average American presidentials. 
Superficially regarded, the second option looks absurd. Half a dozen of successful or 
attempted coups d’état - topped by palace coup of August third this year -, countless 
suppressed manifestations, expelled personae non gratae and banned political organizations 
                                                 
21 Ould Cheikh, Voix, p. 33f. 
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and papers, rather draw a picture of political rivalry and civil resistance 22 . Upon closer 
examination, however, things again stand differently. In order to investigate the traditionally 
and democratically supported monopoly of political power, the social structure of the 
Mauritanian society has - finally - to be focused upon. 
     
Though being in the process of transformation, the present Mauritanian society is firmly 
rooted in traditional structures that display some particular features. Horizontally [figure 7], 
different ethnic, tribal and linguistic communities constitute the Mauritanian identity. 
Vertically, status and dependency define different social layers that arrange themselves into a 
double and complementary hierarchy. The most obvious difference is language. Hassānīya is 
the mother-tongue of about 80% of the population, that is about 2 millions of 2.5 millions. This 
Arabic dialect was imported to the Western Sahara by Arabic nomadic tribes from the 15th 
century onwards and successfully pushed aside the locally spoken Sanhāja Berber - hence 
‘Znāga’. Today, Znaga has disappeared. The Halpulār group, consisting of Fulānī- and 
Tuculeur-speakers, and the small minorities of Soninké-, Wolof- and Bambara-speakers make 
up the rest. Less obvious, although seemingly evident, are the differences of colour. Biology 
and human nature have taken care of that: three centuries of co-existence and inevitable 
intermingling have produced a smooth range of indiscernible complexions. The traditional self-
denominations, "bīdān" (whites) and "sūdān" (blacks), however, do not, in the first instance, 
refer to complexion but to linguistic and social identity. A bīdānī understands himself to be a 
free-born member of the Arab speaking community, in distinction to the abīd, the slaves of 
black-African origin. Quite similarly, the "sūdānī" or "Kwār" are free members of their 
respective ethnic groups, outside and independent of the bīdān society. At the same time, 
however, "sūdān" is used as an external denomination for the ‘abīd, the slaves, who’s existence 
nowadays - by definition of constitution and law - is denied, and therefore sūdān is also applied, 
by logical extension, to those of the Harātīn, the ex-slaves, that are darker than others. Thanks 
to recent political correctness, these sūdāan have made it to be occasionally called hadr 
(greens)23. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Cf. the short overwiew in Hilling, MAURITANIA, pp. 700a-703b. 
23 For a detailed dicussion of the etymological and semantic background of these terms, see Villasante-de Beauvais, Mariella: 
Mauritanie: Catégories de classemant identitaire et discours politiques dans la société bidân [sic], in: Annuaire de l’Afrique 
du Nord, XXXVI, Paris 1999, pp. 79-100, p. 83. 
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Figure 7: Society 
 
 
 
The most crucial element for the understanding of status, relation and identity in 
Mauritanian society is certainly the group of the Harātīn, sing. hartānī. Popular etymology 
designates them as "hurr thānī", as of "secondary free status". Linguistically, the term goes 
back to the Berber root ‘HRTN’, mixed shade of white and black’24. An estimated 40-45% of 
the Mauritanian population is considered to belong to the Hartānī group25. Their corporate 
identity stems back to the historical structure of the bīdān society. At its top, two aristocratic 
groups, the Banū Hassān and the Zawāyā, had divided up among themselves the political and 
spiritual control of the subordinate layers, hence their respective self-portraits as "warriors" and 
"students". Within the ethnic sūdān-minority of the Halpulāren, the Rimbbe aristocrats, the 
warrior-Fulbbe and the scholar-Torobbe, held a correspondingly dominating rank. Below, 
various degrees of social and economic dependency divided the rest of the society into four 
different layers: the Znāga tributaries already mentioned, historically Berber tribes that had 
been subjugated, arabized and contractually been obliged to pay tribute to their Banū Hassān 
and Zawāyā master-tribes in exchange for physical and spiritual protection; further below 
ranked the Harātīn, who’s distinctive legal feature, personal freedom, distinguished them 
essentially from the slaves. Since - historically - every Hartānī was once - by legal definition - 
                                                 
24 Taine-Cheikh, Cathérine: La Mauritanie en noir et blanc. Petite promenade linguistique en hassâniyya, in: Revue du Monde 
Musulman et de la Méditerranée, 54 (1989), pp. 90-105, p. 96. 
25 Ould Saleck, El Arby: Les Haratin comme enjeu pour les partis politiques en Mauritanie, in: Journal des Africanistes 70 (1-
2) 2000, pp. 255-263, p. 257. 
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a slave before being set free, and since slavery had been abolished - by constitutional definition 
-, both layers can be treated together. The Mu’allemīn craftsmen and the Iggāwen singers and 
poets, though dependent too on their respective master-clans and -tribes, formed small 
endogamous subsistent units within this society - and remain to do so until today. Thus, 
numerically, the Harātīn and the ‘abīd have merged nowadays into an overall majority of the 
Mauritanian population. Socially and economically, they form the lower, that is to say 
discriminated and impoverished majority of a society that has now to express its will by way of 
votes - and this continuously in favour of a regime that manages to successfully deny them 
equal access to the resources of status, rights and wealth. 
 
The reasons for this astonishing ‘democratic’ behaviour are rooted in the very basis of 
the traditional Mauritanian society that democracy was ordained to overcome: the tribe that is, 
on its part, the very antithesis of the Modern State. The so-called democratic process 
Mauritania was pushed into is setting free a phenomenon that has been registered only recently 
and has been given different names: "neo-tribalism"26 or "reinvention of chieftainship"27, both 
quotations of recently published investigations. In an official report of the Ministry of the 
Presidential Office of 2003 this retribalisation is carefully circumscribed as being a 
 
"contribution of the democratisation of the political regime to the activation of parental, lineage, 
tribal and regional relations within which a series of institutions and informal practices effectively 
organize the domains of credit, social insurance, job employment, business and trade, and the protection 
of personal and family interests."28 
 
Thus, the two elementary functions of tribal allegiance, competition and protection, turn 
out to have not only survived under democratic conditions but rather infiltrated the 
corporations of the regime itself. 
     
The government, on the one hand, in order to expand her control of all state facilities, 
and the newly installed democratic structures, on the other hand - political parties, municipal 
councils, and so on -, both take recourse in traditionally approved modes of alliance that alone 
can guarantee success and security of the individual. In the manner of a new and supra-tribal 
organism, the state, employee of 20% of the Mauritanian labour force and composed of 
representatives of the major aristocratic tribes, is paying off political loyalty with jobs and 
privileges. Every four years, three to four thousand lucrative key-offices are to be allocated - 
by way of elections. Even the legitimacy of the power to decide this give and take is competed 
for in tribal manners, too: In the November presidentials 2003, both the office-holding 
president and his challenger - and predecessor 20 years ago! -, Ould Haidallāh, belonged to the 
same tribal group, the Turkuz, though to different fractions. Ely ould Vall, the present ruler on 
Nouakchott, was not only for over 20 years Chief of the Security forces, he was also one of the 
earliest and closest partners of the president he brought down. The Mauritanian sociologist 
Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh recently tried to describe this patrimonial management of power 
as "sultanic culture"29. 
                                                 
26 Ould Saleck, Haratin, p. 257: "néo-tribalisme politisé". 
27  Cf. Leservoisier, Olivier: Démocratie, renouveau des chefféries et luttes sociales à Kaédi (Mauritanie), in: Politique 
Africaine 89, Mars 2003, pp. 167-180, p. 172. 
28 Cf. Bonte: Evaluation, p. 25. 
29 Elections présidentielles en Mauritanie, [University of Strasbourg, unpublished report 2004], p. 2: "culture sultanienne". 
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Among the ‘voters’, similar features can be detected: their alignment with political 
parties is regulated by the advantages their tribal, ethnic or regional group have been given - or 
not - owing to the result of the last ballot. Depending on their respective status within the larger 
unit, fractions therefore tend to split away and look for better support from other parties or 
organizations that, for their part, are doomed to persue the interests of their new clients30. 
 
With this vicious circle briefly outlined, we can return to the role the Harātīn play in 
this theatre of democracy. Though having been legally set free, their social and economic 
existence continued to be closely knitted to the benevolence of their former masters. Their 
being excluded - by matrimonial laws - from the patrilinear filiation of the tribal bīdān-system, 
and their being uprooted and deprived - by the tremendous demographic change - of their 
former social bonds, the Harātīn turned from being "domestic servants" into "political 
servants". With the exception of a radical minority that joined the secessionist movement of the 
"Négro-Mauritaniens", the overwhelming majority of the Harātīn sought refuge in siding with 
the political formations their former tribal masters had formed up into31.  
 
To sum up this short review: the democratic process in Mauritania has not only grinded 
to a halt, it has also brought to light again the pre-state tribal structures that are choking the 
country’s development under the pretext of democracy. Inevitably, this failure is fostering a 
multitude of oppositional movements. Apart from the radicalist’s alternative of the secession of 
the black South or - vice versa - of the white North, two main trends can be discerned: 
One, visibly fighting a lost cause, is nourished by the Sūdānī belief in the future of a united, 
multicultural democratic Mauritania [figure 8.]  
 
Figure 8: Walfugi 
 
WALFUGI-CHINGIT * 
                        
Wal <= Waalo, Land of the Wolof 
 
                 FU <= Fuuta, Land of the Peul 
 
                           GI <= Guidimakha, Land of the Soninké and Bambara 
 
                                     CHINGIT <= Land of the Moors 
 
 
* Acronym for movement of national change, founded 2003 
 
                                                 
30 See Lervoisier’s (Démocratie, pp. 173 and passim) detailed analysis of the elctoral behaviour of the Haalpulaar’en and the 
Soninké blacksmiths between 1999 and 2001. 
31 The background of this bifurcate political cooperation is briefly described in Ould Saleck: Haratin, p. 259 and pp. 261ff.; the 
complex antagonism between the Harātīn and the Sūdān and - respectively - the Bīdān is analysed in Ruf, Urs Peter: Du neuf 
dans le vieux: la situation des harâtîn et ‘abîd en Mauritanie rurale, in: Journal des Africanistes 70 (1-2) 2000, pp. 239-254; 
see also Messaoud, Boubacar: L’esclavage en Mauritanie: de l’idéologie du silence à la mise en question, in: ibid., pp. 291-
337. 
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 Basing themselves on the canon of human rights and democratic values, non-political and 
sometimes illegal organisations, partly operating in exile and predominantly supported by 
black intellectuals, advocate a secular modernism of a Western type. This "WALFUGI-
CHINGIT"-movement (an acronym consisting of the initials of all ethnic Mauritanian 
components) that "n’attend que la fin des élections [du 7 novembre 2003] pour sortir 
officiellement de l’ombre"32 may serve as an example of this unbroken optimism. 
 
     The other trend [figure 9], based on the frustration of the aroused democratic hopes and 
fostered by the globally increasing Islamic mistrust in the universal validity of democracy - or 
rather: ‘Western’ democracy -, is gaining ground in all social layers, in particular among the 
impoverished Sūdān and Bīdān, and the Harātīn. Their alternative confronts - in the words of 
one of the few influential journalists - the "Democracy of Athens" with that of the ‘city of the 
Prophet’, the "Democracy of al-Madīna" 33 . Permanent loudspeakers, installed around the 
central market of Nouakchott preach the same message, though in different words. The crucial 
aspect of this cultural scepticism does not primarily refer to the (non-)compatibility of Islam 
and modernity disputed world-wide by Western think-tanks as well as by Islamic conservatives. 
On the contrary, basic Islamic concepts of equality between peoples of different colours and 
languages (as appealed for in Koran 30:22, for instance) are consulted and diffused in order to 
mobilize the believers’ energy against laic, tribal and ethnic priorities. If fundamentalism 
means going back to the roots then the reference to the prophet Muhammad’s fight against 
tribal and racial privileges that the Meccan pagan aristocracy was built upon, turns under the 
ruling circumstances into a necessarily progressive argument. Within this trend, one can 
conclude, the particular Sahelian dilemma is sought to be solved by a complex Islamic ethics: 
In its centre figures Bilāl, the freed black Abyssinian slave of the first caliph Abū Bakr and 
first muezzin of Islam. This Bilāl serves nowadays as the promising symbol of non-white Islam 
in Mauritania (and elsewhere in Islamic Africa). In his figure the concept of ethnic equality is 
fused with the criticism of tribal hegemonism and bondage34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Rencontre avec le Professeur Saidou Kane, 5.11.2003, see: http://www.ocvidh.org/forum/nav.php3?page=voirsujet&board, 
p. 12. 
33 M. Mael Ainine Ould Nema: Air démocrate, laic, moderne et islamiquement correcte, in: Le Calame, no 430, 10.3.2004, p. 
8. 
34 For the ‘Bilālism’ in Mauritania, see Marty: Les multiples usages, p. 65f.; Maxime Rodinson (Mahomet, Éditions du Seuil 
1961, pp. 129-130) has pointed to this particular social non-conformism in the early Meccan Islam. 
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Figure 9: Medina 
 
 
 
 The curious trinity posing in the title of my lecture is taking shape: the general 
disappointment with the democratic process shared by the political opposition, the majority of 
the society and the international institutions engaged, the retribalistic tendencies inspired by 
this failure, and - in response to both - the overall readiness to turn to Islamic concepts of 
reform relate to each other immediately. Although the gearing of this intricate mechanism 
might already have been known by and large, or anticipated partly, the set-up under which it is 
unfolding its effects has recently - and this is the final step to be taken - changed again in a 
significant way. 
 
In 1998, the French Premier, Jacques Chirac, announced the formula of ‘Good 
Governance’ to replace the formula of ‘Democratisation’ as the new guiding principle of 
French development policy. Two years later, the United Nations Development Program took 
over and in February 2001, on their trip to Mali and Tanzania, the presidents of the World 
Bank (James Wolfensohn) and of the International Monetary Funds (Horst Köhler) proclaimed 
their sympathy for this new developmental strategy35. Meanwhile, and not at all surprisingly, 
Mauritania - like other ‘highly indebted’ countries - has fallen in with this internationally 
prescribed shift from a hard- to a soft-line democratisation. Early January 2004, the 
government publicly declared ‘Good Governance’ to be the foremost aim of the national 
                                                 
35 Internationales Afrika Forum 2 (2001), p. 106. 
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reform policy. The African-wide confusion about what ‘Good Governance’ could mean and 
demand is best documented by a meeting of seventeen heads of state and members of the so-
called ‘New Partnership for the Development in Africa’, the following March in Kigali, 
Ruanda. The meeting was held to find out why this initiative, founded three years earlier in 
order to bring about ‘Good Governance’, had hitherto failed, and to discuss anew the priorities 
of this strategy36. 
 
     The meeting coincided with the publication of the guidelines for US development aid 
that the Bush administration had defined shortly before. Five criteria had to be met by the 
receiving countries: free and fair elections, independence of justice, free press, absence of 
corruption, and budgetary assignments to social services. In Mauritania, the discussion about 
‘Good Governance’ has expanded far beyond the governmental groups and raised considerable 
expectations among the population. Above all, the basic concept inherent in the strategy of 
‘Good Governance’ contributes to these expectations. Based on a ‘Good Administration’ and 
supported by the explicit strengthening of the civil society a new partnership between state and 
citizen is imagined 37 . As pointed out exemplarily above, it is the blatant absence of a 
functioning civil administration that provokes ballot rigging, and it is the oppressiveness of the 
apparatus of state that keeps suppressing all tendencies of civil engagement. After fifteen years 
of tremendously failed democratisation, a development strategy is at hand that finally and in 
bilateral agreement tackles the preconditions of democracy. 
 
This is the good news. In these days, one does not have to be a devil’s advocate to 
anticipate the bad news. Most of the Mauritanian non-governmental organisations - we can 
safely and by definition call them the extra-parliamentary, or rather: the extra-tribal opposition 
- draw their inspiration and motivation from Islamic values and concepts. Therefore, the new 
partnership between state and citizen, advocated by ‘Good Governance’, must inevitably bear 
an Islamic imprint. Under the general head-line of the "Medinese democracy" alternative 
models of participation, legitimation and collective solidarity have been proclaimed and partly 
forced from below on the secular state. The ‘High Islamic Council’, although completely at the 
disposal of the President since its introduction 1992, incorporates the early Islamic idea of šūrā, 
of consultation. Notwithstanding the weakness of the institution itself, the principle of 
consultation as opposed to the hierarchy of authority has become an attractive if not trendy 
argument when decentralisation or local autonomy are discussed. One of the few positive 
results of this discussion - to give another example - turned out to be the installation of local 
qādī-law-courts presided over by absolvents of the above mentioned ISERI Institute. In order 
to guarantee any legal sovereignty outside the capital, the legal authorities had to cede the 
dispensation of justice in the field of family and personal law to these muqāta’āt- or district 
courts. Quite evidently, the law dispensed there is not in accordance with the modernists’ 
stipulation - let alone with that of the Bush administration - but rather in harmony with 
traditional Islamic principles of law, with "the strong foothold in Muslim traditions", as we 
have heard above. Mauritanian jurists have insisted on the progressive effects these principles 
may exert on the social acceptance of the legitimacy of the state38. 
      
                                                 
36 Les Racines, no 06, Mars 2004, p. 2. 
37 The press is openly discussing the issue, see for example Les Racines, no 06, Mars 2004, pp. 6-7. 
38 See Monteillet, Sylvain: L’islam, pp. 94, 97-98. 
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Moreover, some of these principles have already started to produce new and unexpected 
outcomes. Let me give you a last example of this ‘Good Governance’ practise inspired by 
Islamic values. This [figure 10] legal judgement (fatwā) was given and signed by a dozen of 
Islamic law experts August 2003 in Nouakchott. It regulates the collection and distribution of 
the Islamic alms taxes (zakāh) for the combating of poverty - one of the governments primary 
and most unsuccessfully pursued goals. In the crucial passage of this fatwā, the funds (sanādīq) 
installed commonly by governmental and non-governmental organisations are permitted to 
collect the religious tax duties and - on behalf of the historical Sultan - to use them for any kind 
of poverty-reducing measure. Early figures of the project were published in February 2004 and 
were promising. Meanwhile, the project was stopped - due to pressure of the modern sultan’s 
administration. 
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Figure 10: Fatwa 
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With democratization having failed, tribalism flourishing on this failure and 
islamisation from below - and outside - articulating itself as the responding vox populi, the 
future development of Mauritania (and other comparable countries) is at stake. The metaphor 
of these [figure 11] three donkeys, none of which has to carry its own head - if properly 
arranged - is meant to illustrate the complex dynamics globalisation has thrown the country 
into. 
 
 
Figure 11: Eselmau 
 
 
 
 
 With ‘Globalisation’ alone, that cannot be done away. Rejection of dogmatic purism 
and inclusion of cross-cultural concepts are demanded. If the instruments of Medinese 
democracy - even in the hands of tribal rivals and only for a transitional period - should be 
rejected for ideological reasons then our three donkeys will have to separate and forfeit their 
communal energy to water the herd. 
 
 
Ulrich Rebstock (Freiburg i.Br. 2005) 
 
 
